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Since Pakistan’s creation in the 1947 partition that separated it from India, the
country has been a source of instability in the region. The author states this is
because Pakistan is driven by a cadre of military officers whose ambitions
outstrip their capabilities. Given that Islamabad has fought and lost multiple
wars with India and has close ties with multiple terrorist groups, the guiding
principles behind Pakistan’s strategic and national security decision making
processes remain a matter of concern for U.S. policy and strategy makers, as well
as counterintelligence and counterterrorism professionals.
C. Christine Fair, Ph.D., is one of the foremost South Asia experts. She’s currently
an Assistant Professor at the Foreign Service school at Georgetown University
and previously served at the RAND Corporation, the United Nations mission in
Afghanistan, and the United States Institute of Peace. Her first-hand knowledge
of the topic makes the book an essential tome for those following South Asia.
The overarching theme of the book is that the Pakistani Army is responsible for
the Lion’s share of the country’s ills as it drives the country into a seemingly
endless spiral of poor choices militarily, economically, diplomatically, and in the
arena of public relations. Dr. Fair thoroughly understands the Pakistani national
psyche and explains it with extreme clarity. Whereas most countries have an
army, she correctly posits that Pakistan is in fact an army that has a country to do
its bidding.
The author used Pakistani defense journals, literature, and doctrine as primary
her sources for the book. With this insight, she is able to demonstrate
authoritatively how military doctrine has shaped the entire national security
perspective for Pakistan. According to their own statements, the Pakistan Army is
the guardian of the nation’s ideology and culture. Her treatment of the Pakistan
Army covers the country’s sociology, psychology, anthropology, religious
trajectory, and military doctrine. Employing such a holistic manner, she deftly
explains how Pakistan under the control of its army has been, is, and (absent a
change in trajectory) will remain a destabilizing force to its own detriment, as
well as that of its neighbors.
When Pakistan and India were rent asunder at the end of the British Empire after
WWII, India retained most of the territory, governmental infrastructure,
resources, and institutions left in place by the British. Pakistan, birthed in a
chaotic environment, had to devise – on the fly - a new national identity, society,
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military, government, infrastructure and culture. Seeking to establish an identity
completely distinct from that of its larger and more powerful Indian neighbor,
the Pakistan Army took control of the control and assumed an antagonistic stance
toward New Delhi, plunging immediately into a war over who would control
Kashmir.
The author frames the Pakistan Army’s paranoia regarding India and Kashmir as
more of an ideological issue than a truly security driven one. Due to the
compulsive desire to match India’s national capabilities, the generals in
Islamabad will continue to pursue reckless courses of action towards New Delhi.
The rallying cry has been to pit “Muslim” Pakistan against “Hindu” India, despite
significant Sikh, Muslim, and Buddhist populations in India, with the Kashmir
card ever at the ready to be played.
Although Kashmir’s intrinsic value (or lack thereof) as a piece of land has been
endlessly discussed, Pakistan’s loss framed its relationship with India – eternal
struggle tinged with envy. Even though Pakistan cannot win in a conventional
war against India, the army has chosen to engage in guerrilla warfare, proxy
warfare, terrorism, low intensity conflict, and, despite repeated losses, full scale
war. India has decisively won every war and sees no need to make any concession
to Pakistan. Yet the generals in Islamabad still expect New Delhi to yield to their
demands, which, counterintuitively, grow after every defeat. Although Pakistan
has not gained one iota of traction, it obsessively seeks equality with India. While
India has fostered a reasonably successful democratic process with economic
expansion, Pakistan has gone completely in the other direction, with multiple
military dictatorships and an economy that needs massive infusions from the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund to subsist.
The Pakistan Army has aggressively pursued a nuclear program in an effort to
seek some modicum of military parity with India, despite withering international
sanctions. Due to its support for numerous terrorist groups, Pakistan came very
close to being declared a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. State Department
and later was almost declared an enemy combatant after the 9/11 attacks. The
army dominates foreign, defense, economic, religious and domestic policies. Its
long-term mismanagement of the country brings to mind Governor Bill Clinton’s
quip from the 1992 campaign about the meaning of insanity: doing the same
thing over and over again and expecting a different result.
As Fair outlines the Pakistan Army’s strategic blunders, she suggests that the gap
between the national capabilities of Pakistan and India will continue to widen in
New Delhi’s favor. The longer Islamabad, under the full sway of the Pakistan
Army defies the consequences of its actions, the harsher the eventual concussion
will be, whether militarily, economically, or diplomatically. The generals in
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Islamabad are willing to suffer endless military defeats to seek an unattainable
advantage vis-à-vis New Delhi and improve their position in Kashmir. This
mentality leads to an endless spiral of defeat that to the western mind seems
irrational.
The Pakistan Army controls the state and every apparatus at its disposal, using
state organs for its own ends. One of the top priorities is serving as the guardian
and protector of Pakistan’s uniquely Islamic identity. Within this paradigm, the
struggle with India is framed as a civilizational one, with existential ramifications
if Islamabad yields to New Delhi. Viewed through this lens, victory is not cast in
military terms per se (as it is unachievable anyway). Victory is not yielding or
conceding any point of order to India. This sense of false optimism (or hubris)
has led to a country run by a military that is revisionist, delusional, and prone to
initiate conflict as a matter of pride.
Dr. Fair’s book belongs on the shelf of those interested in U.S. strategy, policy or
military affairs in South Asia. It also essential is for those seeking to understand
sources of strategic instability in South Asia and how the Pakistan Army’s
sponsorship of terrorism and warfare will ensure the region remains volatile until
Islamabad chooses a more rational path.
Mark Roberts
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